Abstract-Privacy and anonymity are critical security issues to many large-scale MANET applications such as military communication networks. These applications are more likely deploying the networks heterogeneously and hierarchically due to administrative needs or routing efficiency. When the size of the network scales up, the routing overhead incurred by existing flat anonymous routing protocols increases fast as the required number of public key operations increases. This results in deteriorated routing and data communication performance. In this paper, we introduce a novel hierarchical anonymous on-demand routing protocol tackling this limitation. In addition to guaranteeing routing and data delivering security, the scheme provides two levels of anonymity: intra-group and inter-group. By exploiting the hierarchical network structure, it effectively controls computational overhead while preserving anonymity, hence accommodates to larger-scale MANETs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Instant communication support using mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) in applications often demands that networks operate in a large scale. Examples of such applications include automated battlefield support, disaster relief, and vehicular networks, etc. Such networks will be heterogeneous and hierarchically organized due to administrative needs or for routing efficiency. Many routing protocols have been proposed as scalable solutions for large-scale scenarios. These protocols use different mechanisms to achieve routing efficiency, including: clustering mechanisms (HSR [1] and Hi-TORA) [2] ), geological information (GPSR [3] ), dynamic addressing (DART [4] ), grouped motion behavior (LANMAR [5] ), proactive hierarchical routing (HOLSR [6] ), or a hybrid of proactive and on-demand update strategies (ZRP [7] , HARP [8] and SAFARI [9] ).
Many of MANET applications also take network privacy and anonymity as a critical security requirement in order to protect the operation against the security vulnerability of wireless media. A number of anonymous MANET routing protocols have been proposed in recent years. These protocols include ANODR [10] , ANONDSR [11] , ASR [12] , MASK [13] and SDAR [14] . They achieve anonymity goals such as identity anonymity and unlinkability in routing, as well as anonymous data delivery by using various security mechanisms. Typically these protocols use public key cryptography more or less in the route discovery phase. For resource-constrained mobile devices, Jiejun jkong@cs.ucla.edu the public-key operations could result in long route acquisition delay and degrade packet delivery ratio [15] [16] . When the size of the network scales up, the lengths of end-to-end paths grow accordingly on average. This will incur prohibitive computation and communication overhead along a long path. In addition, a long path tends to break more frequently in a mobile network, resulting in frequent maintenance and re-discovery processes. On the other hand, some networks like military communication networks feature hierarchical structures [6] . In civil applications the hierarchicalization of large-scale MANETs improves efficiency and scalability as well. In these cases, hierarchical anonymous routing would help both in adapting to the heterogeneous network constitution and to ensure the anonymous and hierarchical delivery of critical orders and reports.
Thus we are motivated to develop a novel Hierarchical ANonymous On-demand Routing protocol (HANOR). Our new protocol is based on a hierarchical MANET architecture with multi-hop clustering (called group in the paper). We intend to utilize the inherited group management with security features in order to tackle the limitations of flat schemes and achieve an efficient anonymous protocol suitable for hierarchical network architecture. The hierarchical structure allows us to separate anonymity protection for intra-group and inter-group communication. While the small scale intra-group anonymous routing uses flat anonymous protocol, the inter-group routing, instead, utilizes group key management to project groups into individual routing units. The HANOR allows the anonymous discovery of routes and sends data with dramatically reduced cryptographic computation overhead compared with pure flat routing.
The contribution of HANOR is three-fold: first, it's designed to take hierarchical MANET structures into account. For example, in a large-scale MANET consisting of groups formed due to application or administration requirements, each group has a subset of nodes, such as nomadic command posts in the battle field. These nodes are specifically in charge of communication with the outsides of the group. The HANOR operational premises satisfy such a scenario. During inter-group routing, HANOR essentially considers groups as individual routing units, and achieves path anonymity at the upper level of groups. In the meantime, the protocol still achieves node anonymity and path anonymity at the lower node level through exploiting group security premises. Second, HANOR greatly reduces computational overhead for routing. With inter-group routing, computational overhead for nodes interacting in the same group is minimized. As a result, the protocol is expected to require less computation overhead in route discovery. For low-end mobile communication devices, this effect directly translates into less route discovery latency, which results in a higher data delivery ratio. Third, while maintaining node and path anonymity, HANOR conducts group authentication during route discovery, effectively reinforcing the security on the group-level. To summarize, by exploiting the hierarchical network structure, HANOR effectively controls computational overhead while preserving anonymity and providing additional security, hence accommodates to larger-scale MANETs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a brief summary of the flat anonymous routing protocols, the measurements of cryptographic overhead and other related work to motivate our work. Section III describes the network model of this work. Section IV introduces the protocol in detail and Section V presents analysis on anonymity properties. Section VI shows our simulation results. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK AND MOTIVATION A number of anonymous routing protocols have been proposed such as ANODR [10] , ANONDSR [11] , ASR [12] , MASK [13] and SDAR [14] . They are all on-demand protocols but use different approaches. ANODR and ASR use a boomerang type onion, a layered cryptographic structure on which appending and peeling off are performed by the same forwarding nodes. ANONDSR and SDAR use a suggestion box cryptographic structure, i.e, each node appends a cryptographic layer, and the destination peels off all the layers and reconstructs a new onion for return path. MASK and SDAR use periodic hello messages to establish pairwise trust relationship between neighbors. MASK then uses the trust and pseudonyms for route discovery.
Cryptographic tools are important in order to achieve security and privacy in data communications. In these protocols, public key cryptography is used at different stages in routing operations. Usually, public key cryptography uses more CPU time than symmetric key cryptography. For resource-constraint mobile devices, the computation time could be very long [17] . During the route discovery, ANODR and ASR perform asymmetric encryption/decryption primarily in RREP forwarding stage at each hop. ANONDSR and SDAR, instead, perform asymmetric encryption/decryption in RREQ flooding stage at each hop. In addition, ANONDSR and SDAR perform both public key and symmetric key operations at the destination nodes. When message size is taking into consideration, the overhead will increase if a massage needs to be processed in several blocks. We then draw our attention to the usage of the public key cryptography when evaluating existing routing protocols and designing new protocols. For the flat anonymous routing schemes being discussed, the message size will increase along with the path length increase, so apparently when the network scales up to a certain extent, the flat anonymous routing schemes will incur very long route acquisition latency. In a mobile network, such initial latency in data communication will result in low data delivery ratio, since a discovered path may have broken at the time data is transferred.
III. SYSTEM MODEL A. Network Scenarios
The hierarchical mobile ad-hoc network scenario we base this research on has two logical tiers. The lower tier is a network of multi-hop clusters and the high lever is a network of cluster headers (referred as groups and group leaders in the rest of the papers). Such network architecture can be preconfigured by network administrators or fully self-configured. When high-bandwidth backbone networks are possible, gateways in each group will interconnect group leaders. When no physical hierarchy exists, we assume a multi-hop clustering algorithm to form groups and elect leaders. Communication between two group leaders (a virtual link) needs to be relayed by other wireless nodes. Obviously, when groups can be pre-configured and/or physical support is feasible, we expect better performance. So at times, we will include such discussions.
In HANOR, we assume a distributed certificate authority(CA) infrastructure. The CA is responsible for assigning (and thus possessing) the public keys and private keys of all nodes before they join the network. For each group(elected or pre-configured), a pair of asymmetric keys, denoted as (PKg, SKg) are assigned.
The group ID is derived from PKg by the group leader, and distributed to the group members securely. The way the group ID is generated ensures that the group's public key is kept secret from group members. For data communication, we assume that each source-destination pair shares a global trapdoor, as been widely used in existing anonymous routing protocols such as SDAR, ANODR, ASR and ANONDSR.
A node joining the network is preloaded with routing parameters, including its ID, a pool of public/private key pairs PKTn/SKTn, CA's public key PKCA, and the election algorithm with parameters if needed. A node will use more keys and two one-way hash functions H1 and H2 in routing. For security, hash functions will be reconfigured after elections or periodically so to control the aftermath of possible node intrusion.
B. Adversary and attack model
The HANOR protocol is mainly designed to deal with passive attacks. The adversaries could eavesdrop or act protocolcompliantly when being intruders. But we assume their computational power and intrusion capabilities are limited. Multiple attackers can communicate to integrate their knowledge about the network. However, we don't assume a global adversary who is able to monitor all of the wireless transmissions.
IV. HIERARCHICAL ANONYMOUS ROUTING PROTOCOL
A. The Scheme Overview HANOR accomplishes the following anonymous goals: (l)Establishing a path anonymously. This achieves anonymous goal in the route discovery process; (2)Transmitting data anonymously. This accomplishes anonymous goal in data forwarding process.
Anonymous route discovery of HANOR is conducted in a hierarchical way, consisting of intra-group anonymous routing and inter-group anonymous routing. The intra-group anonymous routing includes two phases: (1) route discovery within the source group, where the source node tries to establish an anonymous route towards the group leader, and (2) route discovery within the destination group, where the destination group leader establishes an anonymous route towards the destination. The inter-group anonymous routing phase will establish an anonymous route from the source group leader to the destination group leader. Thus, in a typical scenario where the source and destination reside in different groups, the routing process follows the following three consecutive phases: in the source group, between groups and in the destination group.
We adopt ANODR [10] for intra-group anonymous routing. A few modifications to ANODR protocol are needed so it can be integrated with the inter-group protocol. These modifications are presented throughout the following subsections. On the other hand, route discovery in the source group could wait long before completion due to the fact that the RREQ and RREP procedures are separated by the inter-group routing and intra destination group routing. This could result in negative influence on the successfulness of the route discovery. The problem can be solved in several ways. We will discuss these alternatives in the discussion subsection.
In designing the inter-group routing, we intend to treat each intermediate group as a single routing unit. Such design enables us to retain the cryptographic operation at the group level, which greatly reduces the end-end route acquisition delay. The intergroup routing will establish an one-way relation between groups and keep the cryptographic operation inside the group efficient. Figure 1 illustrates the process of the route discovery for a cross group path. A route is discovered from the source node S to the destination D. LS and LD are the group leaders of the source and destination groups respectively. The routing process consists of three phases. When S wants to discover a route to D, it constructs a route request(RREQ) message and sends it to Ls using local in-group anonymous routing algorithm (adapted ANODR is used for this purpose). According to the RREQ, Ls assembles an inter-group route request message (GRREQ) and send it to all other group leaders in the network. Intergroup routing scheme is used in this stage. Each group leader receiving GRREQ messages tries to find whether the destination is one of its members. It again uses flat anonymous routing algorithm(adapted ANODR) to establish a route to the real destination D, which sends back a route reply(RREP) message to LD. LD continues to reply with a GRREP message to LS, which after receiving GRREP sends RREP to the original source node S. If the original path between S and Ls has been broken due to node mobility, Ls can initiate a reverse route request trying to proactively find a route from itself to S. After the subroute between S and Ls is discovered, an anonymous route has been established from S to D. The rest of the section presents the protocol in detail.
B. Anonymous Route Request 1) Anonymous Route Request in the source group: The anonymous route request starts with intra-group routing in the source group. We utilize ANODR to establish an anonymous route from the source node to the source group leader (Ls).
The original ANODR RREQ message is modified to include two functions: RREQ flood control and informing Ls the destination trapdoor. In addition, considering the fact that Ls will be used by its group members when they initiate a communication, we avoid any direct use of Ls's trapdoor so to prevent the content correlation attack. The modified RREQ message looks like:
<RREQ, seql, pkone, TBO, HV (GID), (Src, trdest, TK)PKLS > where RREQ is a routing control message flag identifying route request, seqi is the sequence number for this route request session, pkone is a one-time use public key to be used in RREP for ANODR to achieve unlinkability, and TBO (padded to a fixed-length) is the onion structure.
The field HV (GID) is used to control the RREQ flooding to be within the group (here, the source group). H1 is a parameterized one-way hash function for each specific group and it is updated after each election process or periodically. Thus, before forwarding a RREQ, each node (including the leader) chooses a random number nr (bounded by a maximum value) and applies H1 on its group ID GID for nr times. Upon receiving an unseen RREQ message (a new seql), a node applies H1 a threshold number of times on GID and compares the results with the fifth field of the received RREQ, i.e., HVr (GID). If there is a match, the RREQ message is from a node of the same group, and it will be forwarded with an updated ni. Otherwise, the RREQ is discarded. Clearly, no real group IDs will be revealed in the route request messages and the flooding is controlled. The trade-off is the computation time for one-way hash function, which can be ignored compared to public cryptosystems.
The last field is encrypted by the public key PKLS of the LS. It serves as a trapdoor of the LS, since it is the only node that is going to and is able to decrypt it. And it also prevents correlations among multiple RREQs sending to the same LS. The encrypted form also protects the source tag Src, the trapdoor for the destination trdest, and an one-time key TK to be used in the RREP procedure. After all, the leader of the source group will receive the RREQ message.
2) Inter-Group Anonymous Route Request: The source group leader Ls initiates the inter-group routing phase by sending an inter-group route request message(GRREQ) to all other group leaders in the network. Each group leader receiving the GRREQ message tries to find the destination in its group. Thus, after Ls receives the RREQ message, it stores seql, TK and Src, picks up a new sequence number seq2, and assembles and floods a new inter-group GRREQ message using the trdest. The seq2
<GRREQ, seq2, PKT, H4 "(GID,), (seq2, trdest)SKG, > The propagation of GRREQ messages is a controlled flooding by H`r (GIDC), similar to the previous RREQ flooding control, together with the sequence number, i.e., only nodes within the group who receive a GRREQ with a new seq2 will rebroadcast it. The last field is used for carrying the destination trapdoor trdest and for authenticating the initiator of the GRREQ. It is encrypted by the source group's private key SKGs and can only be decrypted by the group leaders, so to verify the validity of trdest, and then to issue a search for the destination within the group. Since each group's public keys are kept secret from group members, non-leader nodes can not recover trdest. PKT and H`( GID,) in the GRREQ, and rebroadcasts the message. The S- Table and P-Table tables are used when/if the GRREP is returned. The advantages of using the two fields and the two tables will be discussed in the discussion paragraph later.
In all, when processing a GRREQ, an ordinary node computes only efficient hash operations while a group leader performs additional cryptographic operations to decode the destination. This results in significant computation overhead reduction. On the other hand, every node in the network receives and forwards a copy of each GRREQ. To reduce this routing overhead, many flooding suppression schemes [18] [19] [20] can be used. And if the network has high-bandwidth links supporting interconnection among groups, the overhead of propagating GRREQ messages in a flooding manner can be removed by taking advantage of the physical capability in that broadcasting GRREQ is only over the high-bandwidth links.
3) Anonymous Route Request for the destination: The encrypted form of destination trapdoor trd,st in a GRREQ prevents the destination from knowing that it is being searched. Thus the destination group leader has to conduct another intra-group route discovery. In fact, since the group leaders do not know whether or not the destination is in its group, all the group leaders will initiate a route discovery within the group. This feature increases the routing overhead. But on the other hand, it strengthens the anonymity protection. The group leaders use ANODR to look for the destination, and if found, to establish an anonymous route to it. According to the modified RREQ message format, a leader constructs the following message and initiates a search within the group. <RREQ, seq3,pkone, TBO, Hn, (GIDc), (trdestt, PAD)SKLD > The RREQ message uses a new sequence number seq3 for this routing phase. The HVnT(GID,) is used for RREQ flood control as before. The destination trapdoor trdest is signed by the private key of the leader SKLD. PAD is a random string for making this phase-3 RREQ message the same length with that of phase-I RREQ. Thus, by simply eavesdropping, an attacker is not able to distinguish RREQs in different phases, nor is an legitimate node. But being legitimate, an ordinary node will decrypt the last field of a newly received RREQ using its leader's public key to check if it is the intended destination. If yes, the node initiates the route reply procedure as described in the next subsection. If not, it does nothing. A group leader receiving a RREQ that is not initiated by itself will decrypt the last field using its private key, for the message can be a phase-I RREQ. All the nodes participate in the control flooding of RREQ within the group.
C. Anonymous Route Reply 1) Anonymous Route Reply in the destination group: After the destination successfully verifies the trapdoor, it initiates route reply with a proof prdest for the successful opening on the destination trapdoor. Since the destination node does not know in which group the source node resides, not to mention the source node's identity information, the first step of RREP is targeted at the destination's group leader LD. ANODR's RREP message is modified to carry the necessary information for LD (so is encrypted by LD'S public key PKLD) to further forward the reply. The RREP procedure of ANODR completes the establishing of an anonymous route between the destination and its leader LD. As in standard ANODR, the symmetric encryption by a randomly chosen symmetric key Kseed and the public key encryption of Kseed by pkone ensures untraceability. The added information by HANOR does not weaken the protocol.
< RREP, (Kseed)pk,n, ((Prdest, seq3, K1)PKLD ,TBO)Kseed > 2) Inter-group Anonymous Route Reply: After receiving the RREP, the destination group leader LD recovers the sequence number seq3 and prdest. It remembers the key K1 for later data transfer within the group. K1 is used as session key to encrypt the data payload. LD then sends the second phase GRREP toward the source group: < GRREP, (((PrdeS7t, seq2, K2)SKGD )PKG5, Kn, KEY)EKEY > For security purpose, prdest, seq2, along with a session key K2 (used for ene-to-end encryption during data transfer between LS and LD) are encrypted by the destination group's secret key SKGD and the source group's public key PKG,. These fields are only understandable to the source leader. The message also builds a per hop symmetric link key Kn for data transmission.
All these information are encrypted by the key KEY using the encryption method EKEY. KEY and EKEY are interpreted differently depending on the next hop R on the GRREP path. Specifically, (1) if node R is in the same group, KEY = KEYS = H5j (GID,), and EKEY refers to a symmetric encryption using KEY. Here GID, is the current group ID, H2 is new group specific hash function, and n, is retrieved from table S- Table. The result of hashing nr times with function H2 is used as a symmetric key in the most outer encryption of GRREP. (2) If R is in a different group, KEY = KEYp = PKT and EKEY refers to an asymmetric encryption using public key KEY. Here PKT is retrieved from the P- Table. Then the most outer encryption in GRREP is a public-key encryption. Both encryption methods can only be decrypted correctly by the next hop node R. R records Kn as a VCI(virtual circuit identifier) for data transmission. The advantages of the mechanism are that the relation between the upstream and downstream nodes is not revealed to any nodes, and only a few nodes along group borders need to perform asymmetric cryptographical operations.
In order to understand a received GRREP correctly, an intermediate node will first try to decode it using KEY5. If failed,
i.e, it can not match the KEYS from the decrypted text, it tries to decrypt using the private key SKT that matches PKT. If again failed, the node is not on the path and the GRREP is dropped. A possible solution works as follows. Upon receiving a RREQ from one of its member, the leader Ls immediately respond a RREP as an acknowledge of the request. Then after receiving the GRREP, Ls will initiate a separate ANODR route discovery to establish a route to the previous source. When the previous source replies to Ls's RREQ, it can start sending the first data packet with the RREP.
2) Overhead Trade-off: During the route discovery, each of the nodes in the network receives and forwards a copy of each GRREQ and one copy of RREQ for the destination. This routing overhead is twice the routing overhead generated by a flat protocol like ANODR. When broadcast suppression schemes like passive clustering, or dominant set are used, the overhead remains twice by HANOR. However, understanding that the flooding of GRREQ is merely for establishing anonymous virtual links among the group leaders, we could exploit the possible existence of a physical higher tier network in significantly reducing routing overhead. In many envisioned applications, such physical supports are feasible. The overhead of HANOR, then, will reduce to half since the GRREQ messages can be propagated in the intergroup backbone. This makes the routing overhead of both flat and hierarchical schemes at the same level.
On the other hand, HANOR greatly reduces the sizes of routing packets. Most existing flat schemes use onion. In order to hide the path length, it must be padded to a maximum size. This results in large packets. Broadcasting large control packets increases channel contention, which could result in long queuing delay or packet loss. In HANOR, the onion is padded only up to the size of a group -a much smaller size than in a flat scheme.
In addition, HANOR reduces overall computational overhead. In HANOR expensive public key cryptography is only needed at the border nodes of the groups, rather than at each node if using a flat scheme like SDAR or ANONDSR. An great advantage of HANOR then is the reduced end-to-end route acquisition latency, and this leads to improved data delivery ratio. E. Anonymous Data Forwarding
The design of HANOR is to achieve both data confidentiality and data privacy in data transmission. The former requires an end-to-end encryption while the latter needs per hop treatment to prevent content correlation. Given the design, HANOR is able to prevent a set of colluding attackers from tracing a data forwarding path.
Like the route discovery, the data transmission of HANOR is a three-phase process. Along the forwarding path, HANOR employs a two-tier data variation procedure. The first tier is a three-phase content variation and a three-phase end-to-end encryption. After route discovery, secret sharing is established between the source and LS, between LS and LD, and between LD and destination node. They are symmetric keys of K3, K2 and K1 for these phases respectively. By re-encrypting data per phase using the phase-specific secret keys, content correlation during data forwarding is prevented on the level of phases.
The phase-wise content correlation protection has to be further protected inside each phase. In HANOR, we use a virtual circuit behavior for per hop data forwarding, which is widely used in protocols such as ANODR, ASR and MASK. For intragroup phases, such behavior is guaranteed automatically through ANODR. For inter-group sub-route, per hop symmetric link keys (Kn) have been setup during the GRREP propagation for this purpose. Thus at each hop, the phase-session key protected data payload will be encrypted again using the per hop key. Content correlation is impossible throughout the forwarding path.
F Route Maintenance
In HANOR, when a route breaks, it is not always necessary to re-initiate the route discovery from scratch. Given the separated three routing phases, the rebuild of a broken route can be limited only within the associated phase. This is another advantage of HANOR compared to a flat scheme.
V. ANONYMITY ANALYSIS
Our analysis first concerns the two aspects of the anonymity concept, namely, the identity anonymity, and the unlinkability of the senders and the receivers. The protocol doesn't reveal nodes' identities (including leaders), nor pseudonyms, nor temporal group IDs in route discovery and data transmission. Individual intruders don't obtain additional information about the network except that pertained to the node itself. Cooperative intruders have their best chance if they happen to be on the same routing segment so to break the phase session key and correlate the data packets. In order to trace to the source or the destination, they have to compromise every consecutive nodes which is very difficult to do when the network is large.
There are two major concerns regrading the hierarchy of the network: (1) whether the protocol reveals group structures if they do bear logical organization information that need to be hidden? and (2) whether the hierarchical routing increases the chance for the adversary to trace the routing path? We discuss them below.
A. Group Anonymity
Protecting group structures faces a dilemma: on one hand, in order to preserve advantages of a hierarchical scheme, the intragroup routing should be confined within the area of the group; on the other hand, such action would reveal the group structure. Using HANOR, while each node performs hash function secretly to control RREQ flooding, the sequence number seq reveals the boundary of a group if the adversary can monitor an extended area. Node mobility and group re-election can alleviate this problem since unstable group structure is less meaningful. However, as long as the newly elected group consists of most of the members from the old one, the attackers could still trace the group in a probability based on group venue correlation. Note that the adversary has to be densely distributed and collaborative, which makes the cost of accomplishing such an attack very high. Having some nodes compromised and some GIDs revealed does not result in immediate threat to a group structure if such compromise does not become an extended monitoring.
B. Group Unlinkability
During route discovery, the unlinkability problem has three sub-problems: unlinkability of route request messages at different routing phases, unlinkability of route reply messages at different phases, and unlinkability of route request messages with route reply messages. Recall we assume adversary has no global traffic monitoring ability and the timing analysis can be treated using well adopted MIXing technology such as [21] .
When only external attackers exist, group correlation through route request messages is impossible since the only information indicating a connection is trDest, which is encrypted. The route reply messages are encrypted with different keys at each hop, leaving no clue to an eavesdropper to correlate two replies or to a previous seen request.
With the existence of compromised nodes, if a normal node is compromised, it can only get trDest. Collaborating with other intruders will not generate more useful information. Compromised group leaders cause more problems as they know each other's group public keys. If a source group leader is compromised, it knows the relation between Src and trDest immediately. When collaborating with a compromised node in the destination group, the attacker reveals the relation between the source and destination groups. If a destination group leader is compromised, the situation is similar. However, in a large scale network, the adversary has to compromise a large portion of nodes in order to get such correlation.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
We evaluate through simulation the advantage of controlled computational overhead achieved by HANOR. The evaluation metrics include: (i)Number of public key operations en-route: Only public key operations performed by nodes en-route are counted; (ii)Number of public key operations network-wide: public key operations performed by nodes in the entire network, including those performed by nodes not in route but tried to decrypt the overheard messages; (iii)Number ofpath hops: the average number of hops of routes discovered.
We investigate the impact of network size on the aforementioned metrics for two anonymous routing protocols: ANODR and our proposed HANOR. The network area in the simulation is square, in which nodes are deployed randomly. The transmitting range of nodes is configured to about 370m conforming to the default value of the Qualnet [22] simulator. For different network sizes(i.e., number of nodes in the network), we keep the same node density such that each node has approximately 20 neighbors in its transmitting range. The impact of mobility is not considered in our simulation, but it's expected that with mobility HANOR will perform even better due to its low route discovery latency. For HANOR, we define the groups statically by partitioning the network into grids each of which represents a group. The length of the grid edge is 4 times of transmission range. We randomly generate 500 source-destination pairs and average the results for each data point evaluated. Figure 2 shows the impact of network size on the number of public key operations required for nodes en-route in route discovery. The figure shows that when the network size is less than 3000, the overhead en-route for HANOR is more than that for ANODR. This is because the number of public key operations HANOR performs is determined by the two subpath length and the number of groups between the source and destination, while for ANODR it is largely determined by the actual distance between the source and destination. When the network size is small, for HANOR the total sub-path length in the two source/destination groups can exceed the path length by ANODR. When network size grows, the path length of ANODR grows accordingly, but for HANOR the total number of hops in source/destination groups remains the same, while at the same time the number of public key operations performed during intergroup routing is greatly reduced compared with ANODR. Figure 3 reports the impact of network size on the number of public key operations required for nodes in the whole network in route discovery. It can be seen that the number of public key operations ANODR performs is always more that that performed by HANOR. This is because when a RREP message is broadcasted by ANODR, all nodes who overhear it will try to decrypt the message. However, in HANOR, when a GRREP message is broadcasted, only nodes in groups different from that of the local sender will have to try to decrypt the message using public key operations. The nodes in the same group of the local sender only need to perform efficient hash functions. The overhead reduction of HANOR becomes more obvious when the network size increases as the path length of the inter group communication increases. Figure 4 gives the average number of hops for HANOR and ANODR. It confirms that the number of node-to-node hops of HANOR is only larger than that of ANODR at a constant basis. The additional number of hops are resulted from intra-group routing in source and destination groups which makes the overall path not a shortest-alike path like that of ANODR. When the network size increases, the additional hops by HANOR become less significant compared with ANODR.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a hierarchical anonymous routing protocol HANOR for mobile ad hoc networks. HANOR uses two levels of anonymous routing: intra-group anonymous routing and intergroup anonymous routing. The main advantage of HANOR is that it effectively controls computational overhead using the hierarchical routing scheme and preserves routing anonymity. Our simulations show a much slower increasing rate of public key cryptograph operations compared to a flat scheme. Our future work includes more theoretical analysis on anonymity and routing overhead, extensive evaluation on communication performance and trade-offs under various network conditions.
